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ABSTRACT
When market imperfections are present, which is often the case
for the less developed countries including the Philippines, observable
market prices do not usually indicate true valuations of goods and
resources to society. An alternative method of valuation is thus
needed in the economic evaluation of projects° This is the role of
shadow prices --- prices which would reflect social costs and benefits
and the use of which would lead to proper selection of projects and
thus improved welfare.
This paper summarizes the existing estimates of shadow prices of
goods and resources in the Philippines_ These include a) implicit
tariffs_ b) the shadow exchange rate, c) the shadow wage rate, and
d) the social rate of discount and the shadow price of capital. The
methodologies and assumptions used in the estimation are explained_
Moreover, some policy implications of the results are derived,
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A major task in the economic evaluation of projects is the valuation
of goods and resources they use and produce. If markets function effi-
ciently and freely, observable market prices should sufficiently indicate
this valuation. However, especially in least developed countries (IDC3),
market imperfections are usually present --- arising in part from genuine
market failures such as the existence of non-competitive elements,
externalities, et. al., but more pervasively from government policies
themselves. In such cases, market prices are distorted and would not
be the appropriate social valuation of goods and resources° An alter-
native method of valuation is thus needed, if true costs and benefits
of a project to the society are to be reflected. This is the function
of shadow pricing.
The purpose of this paper is to make an assessment of shadow prices
of goods and resources in the Philippines. In particular, a summary of
the more recent estimates for the Philippines of a) implicit tariffs,
b) the shadow exchange rate or SER, c) the shadow wage rate or SWR,
and d) the social rate of discount and the shadow price of capital,
SPK, will be presented. A brief explanatory note on the methodology
and assumptions used will accompany each estimate. Moreover, some
policy implications of the results will be derived.
*Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
Approaches to Shadow Pricing
There are basically two approaches to shadow pricing, hinging on
the assumption regarding the existence of market distortions. To the
extent that policy-imposed distortions are the most pervasive cause of
the divergence between market and shadow prices, the first approach
proposes that the appropriate shadow prices should be the equilibrium
prices that would prevail if these policy-imposed distortions were
removed. This is the view held by Tinbergen (1958) and, in the case of
shadow pricing of foreign exchange, by Bacha and Taylor (1971). The
implicit assumption is that these policies are purely distortionary and
their removal would lead to the first-best optimum. However, if distor-
tions arise for reasons other than the non-optimal government policies,
e.g. the genuine market failures, the absence of flrst-best corrective
measures is itself the essence of the problem of non-optimality. Thus,
suspension alone of the distortionary policies is not enough. The move
should be towards an optimal intervention system. In any case, this
approach can be generalized to an _attempt to estimate shadow prices
associated with a first-best optimum. In this regard, such shadow
prices are referred to as first-best shadow prices.
The second approach treats the present distortions as given, ioe.,
the distortions will remain during the lifetime of the project. The
problem of shadow pricing then becomes one of deriving the dual solu-
tions to the welfare of optimization problem, with the existence of the
distortions as constraints. The optimization problem is usually not
formally specified but it forms the conceptual framework for shadow
pricing rules. Advocates ot this shadow pricing procedures are Little
and Mirrlees (1969) and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972). The shadow
prices so derived are referred to as second-best shadow prices in the
sense that they represent social costs and benefits of inputs at the
second-best optimum°
A crucial issue then in shadow pricing is related to policy
assumptions, ioeo whether distortions are assumed to persist ar not.
It should be noted, however, that the first-best approach is not yet
feasible for shadow pricing primary factors (i.eo, labor and capital)°
Available data and techniques are still inadequate_ Even the first-best
estimate of the SER is limited to a partlal-equilibrium analysis.
Estimates of Shadow Prices of Goods and Resources
in the Philippines
A project's input can either be intermediate or primary. In turn,
the intermediate inputs, as well as the project's output(s), can either
be tradable or nontradable. Primary factors, on the other hand, are
usually treated as nontradables. Accordingly, the shadow price esti-
mates are presented below for (a) outputs and intermediate inputs:
tradable and nontradable, (b) foreign exchange, (c) labor, and
capital. _/
!/The income distribution parameter is ignored since its estima-
tion involves value judgement, which for the present cannot be suffi-
ciently justified.
The most recent and comprehensive estimate of shadow prices for
the Philippines (and perhaps, except for implicit tariffs for 1965 done
by Power and Sicat (1971), the only estimates) are found in Bautista a_d
Power (1979). These estimates are presented below, along with some
explanation of the methodology used.
A. Outputs and Intermediate Inputs
i. Tradable Commodities
It is generally recommended by various studies including Little
and Mirrlees (1969) and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972), that tra-
dable, commodities should be valued at their relative international
prices even though distortionary tariffs and other taxes are pre-
sent. z/ The rule does not depend on whether or not the distortion
will be eliminated. The intuitive explanation is that the world
market is always an alternative source or destination of commodities,
and tariff revenues are mere transfers of funds (See Warr (1977) for
more rigorous proof)° Thus, the social opportunity cost of a tra-
dable commodity should be its border price.
The shadow price estimates for tradable commodities (their
Z/It is clear that the first-best shadow prices for traded commodi-
ties should be their relative international prices. It is not so obvious,
however, for the second-best case. Weckstein (1972) argues that inter-
national prices, which are essentially first-best in nature, are irrelevant
second-best shadow prices. In reply, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974), fol-
lowed by Boadway (1975), argue that international prices are the correct
second-best shadow prices except when there is a government budgetary
constraint. In a subseque_ paper, Warr (1977) shows that neither of the
cases argued by Weckstein and Dasgupta-Boadway implies shadow pricing
traded commodities differently from their relative international prices.
5respective border prices) are more meaningful if presented in terms
of a proportional difference between domestic and border prices,
i.e., the implicit tariffs° Besides acting as conversion factors
between domestic and border prices, they carry in themselves
important policy implications. (See discussion on policy implication).
If one lets T stand for implicit tariff_ then,
T = domestic price 1
border price
where both prices are in domestic currency terms.
To estimate T_ two methodologies are apparent -- direct
price comparison or its derivation from legal tariff and tax rates.
Under perfect competition and identical quality conditions, they
should yield the same results° However, when these assumptions
are relaxed, estimates from the two methodologles often differ.
Due to possibilities of evasion, redundancy, and significant
import control, direct price comparisons may be preferred° The
Industrial Promotion Policies in the Philippine s (IPPP) study,
however, recommends the use of legal tariff and tax rates, except
whem homogeneity can be approximated_ due to a considerable degree
of heterogeneity of products_ The argument is that protection
afforded by a tariff may not completely be manifested in price
differential but is effectively more important in its protection
of the market share.
A summary of estimates of implicit tariffs for 1969 and 1974
is given in a table appended to Special Paper No. 2 of Bautista and
6and Power (1979) and need not be presented here°
2. Nontradable Commodities
Two methodologies in shadow pricing nontradables are suggested
in the literature. The first is the '_foreign exchange equivalent '_
rule of Little and Mirrleeso Essentially, the method is to decompose
nontradables fully into tradable and primary factors which are then
valued at their international price. The second method is the
"weighted average" rule by Boadway (1975) and Harberger (1969). The
method determines the effect of a unit change in the public use
(production) of the nontradable commodity on consumer and producer
surplus. Wart (1977) shows that these rules are equivalent when
there are no nontradable consumption goods. In any case, theprob-
lem of shadow pricing nontradables is one of determining specific
conversion factors for each nontradableo
The merit of either method will not be discussed in this
paper. What is crucial is the extent to which commodities are
considered traded rather than nontraded. Little and Mirrlees, as
well as Bautista and Power, recommend "leaning over backwards" to
include commodities in the traded category.
There are no estimates of specific conversion factors for specific
nontradables for the Philippines. The IPPP study, however, suggests
a one-stage decomposition of nontradables whenever they contain
major tradable components and recommends the use of the SER as a
general conversion factor.
Bo The Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange
In the IPPP study, the existing methodologies for measuring
how much the SER has actually diverged from the OER which resulted from
the distortion created by the protection are presented, l/ One measures
the marginal social value of foreign edchange under the existing pro-
tection system (UNIDO mehhod) while the other considers the free-trade
equilibrium exchange rate as the shadow price of foreign exchanges
(Bacha-Taylor method). An element of inconsistency in the UNIDO position
arising from the assumption of continuing protection was noted° This
relates to the fact that project evaluation is designed to bring out real
comparative advantage and in the long run eliminates the need for protect-
ion other than that required by an optimal intervention system. On the
other hand, modification of the free-trade assumption is suggested in the
study to take into account various market failures likely to be present
in an LDC. A model for estimating SER under the assumption of an optimal
intervention system is thus formulated.
These approaches yield three different formulas for estimating the
SER. The UNIDO method derives a simple weighted arithmetic average of
implicit tariffs. The Bacha-Taylor method, on the other hand, gives a
weighted geometric average of the same implicit tariffs. Finally, the
model for estimating SER under the assumption of an optimal intervention
system yields a weighted geometric average, also of the same implicit
tariffs, but deflated by what they ought to be in the optimal inter-
Z/The case when there is disequilibrium in the Balance of Payment
(BOP) is discussed in an appendix to Special Study Noo i in Bautista
and Power (1979).
8vention system (See Special Study No. 1 in IPPP).
For all the three approaches, the ideal weights to use are the
marginal imports and exports. Previous studies suggest using as proxies
either actual levels of imports and exports or total domestic supply
(i.e., Q + M for importables and Q - X for exportables, where
Q is domestic production and M and X are imports and exports,
respectively). The problem with the former weighting system is that it
will produce a downward bias in the SER estimate since low tariffs will
naturally be associated with high imports and high tariffs with low
exports. Furthermore, it assumes uniform trade elasticities. The IPPP
study thus recommends using the latter and innovates a second weighting
system ( 1.5 Q + M for imports and 1.5 Q - X for exports ) which
though still with limitations, the study argues to be employing far less
stringent assumptions (See Special Paper No. 2 in IPPP). The study also
notes that the SER estimate was not very sensitive, whether one or the
other weighting system is used° The really important task is to be able
to get good estimates of the implicit tariffs.
The SER estimates under the alternative policy assumption are
calculated for the Philippines using 1974 data. Computatiom yields a
value of 1.34 of the OER as the UNIDO '_second-best SER estimate", 1o32
of the OER as the Bacha-Taylor estimate and 1.16 of the OER as the
first-best estimate under the assumption of an eventual optimal inter-
vention system. The wide gap between the first-best and second-best
estimates implies that some projects viable at UNIDO shadow prices under
protection would not be socially profitable under the optimal trade
9regime. Thus, a careful choice between them is required. If proJectm
could be finished without costs, the choice would be less critical.
However, the study notes that there is lack of symmetry between the
cost of starting and ending an enterprise. Thus, using an SER higher
than the first-best optimal intervention involves a risk that enter-
prises whose vested interest may eventually stand in the way of the
adoption of the optimal intervention system will be started. The
study therefore recommends the use of the first-best SER in project
evaluation.
C. The Social Opportunity Cost of Labor
The shadow price of labor is estimated only for unskilled category.
Market wages for skilled labor are deemed to sufficiently reflect
opportunity costs, the market for which is judged fairly competitive.
The process of estimating the shadow wage rate is mainly one of
identifying the consequences of transfering labor to project employment.
In the first instance, the use of labor by the project prevents its
use _isewhereo The foregone output thus constitutes the direct
opportunity cost. Second, due to higher wage in project employment,
there is an increased consumption involved which could either be a
cost or a benefit or both from the standpoint of the objectives of
growth and equity. This constitutes the indirect opportunity cost.
I0
The complete formula for the SWR used in the study is given by_/
L
SWR = z _ + ( s - sw ) ( w - z ) (SPS - d)
-(l -s) (w- z) (_- I)
where z = marginal products of labor in agriculture
L = urban labor force
N = urban employment
s = economy saving rate
sw = the worker's saving rate
w = market wage rate
SPS - the shadow price of saving
d = the income distribution parameter
L
The first term in the formula, z _ , gives the direct
opportunity cost of employing labor by the project since the impact of
additional project employment is to induce rural-urban migration, thus
L
foregoing output in agriculture. _ is what migration theorie
suggest to be the number of rural migrants per additional job created
in the city.
The second term, ( s - sw ) ( w - z) ( SPS --d ) , Indicates
the cost of increased consumption due to decreased saving (workers are
assumed to save less than average income earners).
Finally, the last term of tile expression is the benefit arising
!/The indirect cost of the disutility of increased effort called
for in the new job is ignored, following the view that people want or
should want productive employment rather than enforced idleness.
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from increased consumption of the unskilled workers who belongs to
the low-income group. A premium, indicated by how much it is greater
than unity, is placed on costs and benefits accruing to low-income
group.
There is thus, in using the SWR in project evaluation, a
simultaneous consideration of growth and equity objectives. How
SPS should be estimated is dealt with in Special Paper No. 3 in
IPPP and is summarized below. There has been no attempt to estimate
the parameter d and it will not be done in the paper° Its estimation
requires value judgement, which for the present, cannot be adequately
rationalized.
Results of the IPPP study for the SWR esti_te are summarized
in the table below.
Shadow wage rate estimates for the Philippines
Year z Effective minimum SWR SWR
(per day) daily wage rate, w w
1969 3.26 6.60 5.10 .77
1974 5.39 8.80 7.58 °86
1977 9°28 16.84 13o73 .81
D. The Social Rate of Discount and the Shadow Price of Capital
Let i represent the social rate of discount
ip , the private rate of discount
12
qp, the private rate of return
and q , the marginal product of capital
Sen (1967) argues that when individuals act independently in their
savings decision, each has a tendency to "free-ride" although each shares
a co_on concern for the future generation, resulting in a sub-optimal
level of saving and i _ ipo This is Sen's well-known isolation paradox.
An additional distortion is created if the capital market is imperfect,
resulting in a wedge given by ip <._q. Furthermore, if there is labor
surplus and wage dualism (as indicated by a market wage exceeding SWR),
qp _q° Thus, i _ q, as will be seen in the formulas for the shadow
price of capital, SPK, given below, implies that SPK _ i, ioe., there
is a premium placed on investment over consumption.
Assuming that cppital employed in the investment considered comes
entirely out of alternative investment, the formula for SPK is
easily derived as
(1-s)qSPK =
1 - sq
by solving for the present value of the future stream of consumption
per unit value of investment (See Special Paper No. 4 in IPPP)o
in estimating i, the IPPP study uses two methodologies, one
representing an upper limit, the other a lower limit. The first uses
the Keynes-Ramsey rule which assumes an optimal savings program.
An optic11 consumption path implies equal marginal utility of
13
consumption for all time periods. This leads to the formula
i - q - nl+n
where n is population growth. Since an optimal savings program
is assumed_ this is considered the upper limit for i.
The second methodology used is the one suggested by Squire and
van der Tan (1975)_ using the concept of elasticity of marginal utility
of consumption with respect to changes in per capita consumption.
This gives the formula,
i ffi gh
where g is the rate of growth of per capita consumption; and
h is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to per
capita consumption.
The problem in the Squire and van der Tan approach is estimating n,
necessitating making arbitrary assumptions regardingthe form of utility
function°
The IPPP study yields empirical estimates of i ranging from
9 to 12 percent using the methodologies_ The estimate of SPK, on
the other hand, ranges from 1.84 to 2.82°
Some Policy Implications of the Wedge Between Market and Shadow Prices
The i_licit tariff estimates, aside from representing conversion
factors between domestic and border prices, have important policy
implications when used to estimate the effective rate of protection (EPR)
14
and the SER.
Results of the IPPP study show a highly uneven EPR structure,
revealing highly protected inefficient industries and lightly protected
(even penalized) efficient industries with regards to the SER. On the
other hand, the estimate was significantly higher than the 0ER. This
implies a general penalty on exports°
The first-best remedy is tariff reduction. _/ The Philippines is
in the process of moving towards this direction° However, the process
should take place gradually to alleviate reallocation costs. A question
thus remains whether or not during the transition, some tariff compensa-
tion is required. The answer depends upon whether tariff compensation
will increase or decrease welfare.
If (i) eligible industries could be correctly identified for
tariff compensation and (2) the opti_um level of tariff compensation
can be quantified with some degree of confidence, then welfare would
be improved° Otherwise, tariff compensation could potentially decrease
welfare. Care should therefore be taken regarding these considerations.
The SWR estimate of 81 percent of the market wage indicates that
a subsidy of 19 percent to employment be given. The problem is the
source of financing and other political constraints. _/ Thus, perhaps,
we should hold off recommendation of such subsidy for the present and
Z/Tariff uniformity is the ultimate goalo
_/For example, mamy feel that labor could use this subsidy as a
bargaining position to increase wages.
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just urge the use of the SWR in project evaluation.
Finally, we come to the estimate of the SPK, The SPK estimate
ranging from 1o84 to 2.82 implies a very radical recommendation
of taxing the use of capital from 84 to 182 percent. This is,
obviously, too bold to suggest.
The wedge between SPK and unity arises from 3 sources. First
is the implicit assumption that the government is unable to raise
savings directly, e.g., through fiscal policies. The problem of
sub-optimal savings must therefore be faced at the project level.
Denying this assumption and accepting that the government can enforce
an optimal saving program (i.e., reducing the gap between i and
ip) by more direct means, would bring down the SPK to 1.84. Second,
the elimination of the assumption of labor surplus and wage dualism
7/
(i.e., making qp _ q) would further bring down the SPK to 1.3.-
The value of SPK can be further brought down to unity if we assume
mero population growth (i.e., finally making i = ip) and the capital
market is perfect (i.e., ip = qp). However, the former assumption
is unacceptable and the latter is unrealistic° Thus, the user tax on
capital recommended by the IPPP study is reduced to 30 percent.
Im_pllcations on Need for Further Research
The above discussion points to basically two areas for further
research. The first is with regards to getting more recent estimates
7--/Theseestimates are all taken from the IPPP study.
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of shadow prices. The data base used was for 1974 (except for SWR
which used 1977 data). The second is concerned with incorporating,
when necessary_ recent developments in the theoretical literature
on shadow prices into the estimates° For example, Warr and
Wright (1980) argue that the proper discount rate to use should
still be the private rate of discount. This has implications on
the estimates of both SPK and SWR.
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